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KEIM ON THE MUZZLE RULE: A REPLY AND JOINDER 
 
REID MORTENSEN∗  
 
 
I   BACKGROUND: DR HANEEF AND THE KEIM COMPLAINT 
 
A commission of inquiry has now established that the handling of the ‘Haneef 
affair’ by the Australian Government and the Australian Federal Police (‘the AFP’) 
was affected by poor processes of decision-making.1 The AFP’s and Immigration 
Department’s investigations into Dr Mohamed Haneef, his alleged association with 
terrorists who bombed Glasgow Airport, the laying of anti-terror charges against the 
doctor, and the cancellation of his visa relied on inaccurate evidence.2 They also 
discounted benign assessments of Dr Haneef by the Australian Security Intelligence 
Organisation, and ignored the British authorities’ lack of interest in him.3 
Investigators had no forum ‘that enabled robust and open discussion with respect to 
the available evidence, the differences that existed, and the precise roles and 
functions of the relevant departments and agencies’.4 Together, these led to 
‘misconceptions and miscommunication’ about the doctor.5   
The commissioner, John Clarke QC, had no comment on the complaints made 
to Queensland’s Legal Services Commissioner about Stephen Keim SC, Haneef’s 
barrister, by AFP Commissioner Michael Keelty and, separately, by solicitor Russell 
Biddle.6 However, it is still possible to understand these complaints in the broader 
context of the policies, approaches and practices adopted by the AFP throughout the 
Haneef affair. If we do, to the mistakes made as a result of the decision-making 
processes used in the Haneef investigation we can add at least one other error: using 
Rule 60 of the Legal Profession (Barristers) Rule 2007 (Qld) as the basis of the 
complaint. 
I emphasise that the complaint about a breach of Rule 60 amounts to one more 
error at the very least on the part of the AFP. The mere lodging of the complaint 
itself might be yet another. Having only a limited opportunity to represent his client 
in the usual field where a barrister is expected to use partisan, adversarial tactics – 
the courtroom – Keim then outmanoeuvred the AFP and the Government in another 
field – the media. With hindsight, the complaint by Biddle (a suburban solicitor, and 
National Party candidate in a State election, who had no connection whatsoever to 
the Haneef affair) now looks political. The AFP’s complaint was unrelated to 
Biddle’s, but when the losing side lodges a complaint against the successful barrister 
it smacks of pique.7 However, leaving appearances to one side, any solid evidence of 
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1  MJ Clarke, Report of the Inquiry into the Case of Dr Mohamed Haneef (2008). 
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5  Ibid, 230. 
6  Cf ibid, 285-6. See also Bar Association of Queensland, Report to the Legal Services 
Commissioner - Biddle and Keelty v Keim, 17 December 2007 
<http://www.lsc.qld.gov.au/31.htm> at 30 October 2009.  
7  For a recent view that the AFP Commissioner’s complaint against Keim ‘exacerbate[d] 
the damage’ already caused by the AFP’s handling of the Haneef affair, see Editorial, 
‘Keelty Expanded Size and Scope of the AFP’, The Australian, 7 May 2009, 15.  
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the AFP’s true motive for making the complaint is presently lacking. It may well be 
that the AFP was legitimately concerned that a record of interview should not be 
made available to the public because it could affect any ongoing investigations or the 
conduct of any trial.8 But we cannot be sure of this as the AFP did not express any 
concern about the selective leaks of the record of interview by unnamed sources 
from the government side of the Haneef investigation.9 Without evidence of the 
motive for complaining, we cannot properly judge how sensible it was for the AFP 
to make the complaint. It is possible, though, to judge the wisdom of bringing the 
complaint against Keim on the basis of Rule 60 – which will be referred to as the 
‘muzzle rule’.10 This is the very point that Keim himself has taken up in the 
preceding comment. 
Few professional conduct rules, if any, that have been set for any branch of the 
legal profession in Australia have less credibility than the muzzle rule. The source of 
this discredit lies in the basic purpose of the rule – to limit severely, and even deny, 
public expression by barristers in relation to potential or current legal proceedings 
and in which the barristers are briefed. Keim’s fundamental criticism of the muzzle 
rule is based on this, although it is also tied to the specific context of the Haneef 
affair and to a broad grouping of Dr Haneef’s ‘adversaries’: AFP officers, the Prime 
Minister, the Attorney-General, the Minister for Immigration and Citizenship. 
Keim’s release of the police record of interview with the doctor amounted to, as he 
puts it, ‘communication on government action and political matters’ and 
‘communication … intended to reflect upon … actions by the Ministers of the 
Crown’.11 He therefore questions whether the muzzle rule, if it was broken by the 
release of the transcript, ‘may not infringe the right to communication on 
government and political matters implied in and protected by the Constitution’.12 In 
the second place, Keim questions the rule’s compatibility with Chapter III of the 
Constitution, which deals with the federal judicature. If again the muzzle rule was 
broken by the release of the record of interview, it could undermine ‘an essential 
incident of the judicial process’: ‘the ability to exercise one’s rights as a barrister in 
defence of a client’.13 In the context of the Haneef affair, effective defence demanded 
‘counteracting law enforcement leaks, falsely denigrating [the] client and destroying 
his occupation’.14   
Keim’s hope in this journal is ‘to stimulate further discussion about the way in 
which disciplinary rules are used’,15 and this is certainly worth further inquiry and 
comment. To that end, I agree with Keim on the effect of the muzzle rule – but with 
                                                 
8  The AFP submitted to the Clarke Inquiry that Mr Clarke should recommend that it 
should be an offence to release records of interviews. However, the recommendation 
was not made as Mr Clarke did not consider it to be within his terms of reference, and 
he did not have the benefit of submissions from other interested parties: Clarke, see 
above n 1, 285-6.   
9  For media reports of interviews with Haneef before Keim released the whole record, see 
Letter, Brian Bartley to Daniel O’Connor, 8 October 2007, Appendix  2 
<http://www.lsc.qld.gov.au/31.htm> (‘Bartley Submission’).  
10  The term seems to originate in Greg Chamberlin’s news reports in the Courier Mail: G 
Chamberlin, ‘Lawyer Slams Media ‘Muzzle’ Rule’, Courier Mail, 12 June 2007, 15 
(‘Chamberlin 1’); ‘State Lawyers Act to Remove Media Muzzle’, Courier Mail, 13 June 
2007, 7; G Chamberlin, ‘Gag Rule Threatens Balanced Comment’, Courier Mail, 14 
June 2007, 35 (‘Chamberlin 2’). 
11  S Keim, ‘Fearless Advocacy and Bar Rule 60’ (2009) 28(2) The University of 
Queensland Law Journal 325. 
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qualifications. I suggest that there are serious moral flaws in the rule that emerge 
from its effect on expression and on the lawyer’s role in the legal process. However, 
I am uncertain about the nature of any constitutional difficulties for the rule and the 
effect they could have. In all likelihood, the rule is not even purportedly law, and 
therefore might for that reason escape constitutional assessment. Still, the intrusion 
of the rule into the ‘space’ for expression secured by the right of free communication 
nevertheless raises intriguing questions as to how the muzzle rule could amount to an 
effective professional restraint on any barrister who finds him or herself in a position 
similar to Keim’s in the Haneef affair.  
 
 
II   THE MUZZLE RULE: A HISTORY 
 
 A   The Bar: Adoption by Inaction  
 
The Queensland bar’s muzzle rule originates in Rule 59 of the Australian Bar 
Association’s Advocacy Rules (which are designed for barristers).16 It provides: 
 
(a) A barrister must not publish or assist the publishing of material 
concerning a current proceeding except by supplying only: 
 
(i)  copies of pleadings or court documents in their current form, 
which have been filed and which have been served in accordance 
with the court’s requirements; 
(ii)  copies of affidavits or witness statements, which have been read, 
tendered or verified in open court, clearly marked so as to show 
any parts which have not been read, tendered or verified or which 
have been disallowed on objection; 
(iii)  copies of transcript of evidence given in open court, if permitted 
by copyright and clearly marked so as to show any corrections 
agreed by the other parties or directed by the court; 
(iv)  copies of exhibits admitted in open court and without restriction on 
access; 
(v)  answers to unsolicited questions concerning the current proceeding 
and the answers are limited to information as to the identity of the 
parties or of any witness already called, the nature of the issues in 
the case, the nature of the orders made or judgment given 
including any reasons given by the court and the client’s intentions 
as to any further steps in the case; 
(vi)  copies of submissions used in open Court and available to the 
parties, provided that where the barrister is engaged in the current 
proceeding, the barrister does so only with the consent of the client 
first obtained. 
 
(b) Subject to sub rule (a), a barrister must not publish or take any step 
towards the publication of any material concerning any current or 
potential proceeding which – 
 
(i) is inaccurate; 
(ii)  discloses any confidential information; 
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(iii)  appears to or does express the opinion of the barrister on the merits 
of the current or potential proceeding or on any issue arising in the  
proceeding, other than in the course of genuine educational or 
academic discussion on matters of law. 
 
The rule is also replicated precisely in Rule 19 of the Law Council of 
Australia’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice (which is designed 
for solicitors).17 The particular form that the muzzle rule in Rule 59 and Rule 19 now 
has, with its detailed restrictions on publishing material about potential or current 
proceedings, was introduced into the Advocacy and Model Rules in April 2002.  
Neither the Advocacy nor the Model Rules are themselves directly applicable to 
any lawyers in Australia; but with adjustments here and there they have been 
adopted in most States and Territories. That said, when compared with other 
Australian lawyers’ professional associations, the lawyers’ guilds in Queensland 
have been amongst the slowest to engage with the development of comprehensive 
codes of professional conduct like the Advocacy and Model Rules. The principal 
result of their disengagement was that, as social and regulatory pressure built to put 
in place a conduct code of minimum standards of lawyer behaviour, the Bar 
Association and Queensland Law Society were effectively compelled to adopt those 
that had been developed out-of-State. Furthermore, the State and Territory guilds 
have assumed that the Australian Bar Association and the Australian Law Council 
have produced codes that reflect good ethics. So, the Advocacy and Model Rules 
were principally adopted in Queensland for securing interstate uniformity of conduct 
codes – rather than because of any close and independent survey of the ethics 
underlying the codes that were on offer.18 The current pressure for uniformity is 
strong and there is a sense that it is a fait accompli that the national association’s 
codes will be adopted. Consequently, State and Territory professional associations 
have undertaken, at best, only superficial reviews of the ethical groundwork of the 
code to be adopted, and it is quite possible for a rule to appear in a State or Territory 
code without explanation. 
Still, the Bar Association of Queensland was the faster of the Queensland 
guilds to adopt a conduct code. It used the Advocacy Rules as a model for the 
Queensland Barristers’ Rules as early as 1995. At that stage, in the complete 
absence of any regulation for the Queensland bar, these merely applied to members 
of the Bar Association as terms of the compact between them (and not all practising 
barristers were members). They were rules of a club, albeit a club that is most 
significant for the administration of justice.19 However, in 2004 a new Legal 
Profession Act made the Bar Association a regulator of practising barristers, and the 
Queensland Barristers Rules, with adaptations, were given the status of subordinate 
legislation applying to all barristers as the Legal Profession (Barristers) Rule 2004 
(Qld).20 The adaptations for the Barristers Rule 2004 included the muzzle rule in 
                                                 
17  Law Council of Australia, Model Rules of Professional Conduct and Practice, March 
2002 (‘Model Rules’). 
18  For examples of State and Territory lawyers’ guilds abandoning homegrown codes to 
adopt the Model Rules, see GE Dal Pont, Lawyers’ Professional Responsibility in 
Australia and New Zealand (2nd ed, 2001) v, ix.  
19  See R Mortensen, ‘Becoming a Lawyer: From Admission to Practice under the Legal 
Profession Act 2004 (Qld)’ (2004) 23 The University of Queensland Law Journal 319, 
338-9; GE Dal Pont, Lawyers’ Professional Responsibility in Australia and New 
Zealand (1996) x.    
20  Mortensen, see above n 19, 337-8, 341-2. For the status of the Legal Profession 
(Barristers) Rule 2004 (Qld) as subordinate legislation, see Legal Profession Act 2004 
(Qld) s 215(1)(b)  and the discussion below at nn 43-44.  
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Rule 60, which is Rule 59 of the Advocacy Rules word-for-word. No justification 
was given for its adoption. The Advocacy Rules were the only standard on offer, and 
so the muzzle rule passed into the Barristers Rule as part of the exercise of 
standardising the bar’s professional conduct rules with those of other States. There 
was not a peep from the media, nor from barristers themselves, on the impact that 
this rule could have on effective practice. The muzzle rule was perpetuated without 
change as Rule 60 when, with the advent of the Legal Profession Act 2007, the 
Barristers Rule 2004 was repealed and, although with a different legal status,21 the 
Barristers Rule 2007 replaced it.  
 
B   The Proposal to Muzzle Solicitors: A Noisier Process  
 
The Queensland Law Society’s experience with professional rule-making, and 
the muzzle rule in particular, could have hardly been more different. For many 
decades, the Law Society’s professional rule-making was ad hoc. The Society’s 
closest equivalent to a comprehensive professional code – the Solicitors’ Handbook 
– was by the early 2000s still a mere pastiche of subordinate legislation and Law 
Society Council rulings. It had nevertheless long been thought in the solicitors’ 
branch that, despite its mottled quality, the Handbook was a solicitors’ conduct code, 
until in 2003 the Supreme Court held that much of the Handbook could not be 
enforced.22 Even so, as Gino Dal Pont points out elsewhere in this journal,23 the Law 
Society had been excessively reluctant for clients to be able to appeal to the 
Handbook as a professional standard that solicitors could be held to, and had gone to 
some lengths even to hide the contents of the Handbook from the general public. 
And, although in the Legal Profession Act 2004 there was express provision for the 
making of an enforceable solicitors’ conduct rule,24 the Law Society still never 
presented one for promulgation. It was only as the commencement of a new Legal 
Profession Act 2007 on 1 July 2007 loomed, that preparations were made for the 
Law Council’s Model Rules to be adopted as a professional conduct code for 
Queensland solicitors. At that point, over June 2007, the Law Society met a barrage 
of media criticism about the effect that adoption of the muzzle rule in Rule 19 of the 
Model Rules would have on litigation practice.  
Two sectors generated the criticism: journalists in the Murdoch stable,25 and 
solicitors who typically acted against the Government.26 The recurring theme was 
the importance of free expression to client interests, especially in light of Queensland 
Government efforts to limit freedom of information at a time when there was ample 
evidence of dangerously negligent administration of State hospitals.27 Showing some 
                                                 
21  See text below at nn 45-47. 
22  Holland v Queensland Law Society Inc [2003] QSC 327, [11]-[12]. 
23  GE Dal Pont, ‘Regulation of the Queensland Legal Profession: The Quinquennium of 
Change’ (2009) 28(2) The University of Queensland Law Journal 183. 
24  Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 215(1)(a). 
25  G Chamberlin, ‘State Gags Lawyers by Media Ban’, Courier Mail, 2 June 2007, 17; 
Editorial, ‘Lawyer Gag Not in the Public Interest’, Courier Mail, 7 June 2007, 28; S 
Leahy, ‘Freedom from Information …’, Courier Mail, 12 June 2007, 23 (Cartoon); C 
Merritt, ‘Two States Reject Gag’, The Australian, 29 June 2007, 32. 
26  P Carter, ‘In the Public’s Interest to Fight Gag’, Courier Mail, 5 June 2007, 14 (Letter); 
C Merritt and H Thomas, ‘Lawyers Choke over Plan for Media Gagging’, The 
Australian, 8 June 2007, 27;  Chamberlin 1, see above n 10; ‘State Lawyers Act to 
Remove Media Muzzle’, see above n 10; Chamberlin 2, see above n 10.  
27  For the circumstances that led to these criticisms, see generally C Burgess, ‘Can “Dr 
Death” Receive a Fair Trial’ (2007) 7 Queensland University of Technology Law 
Journal 16, 16-17.  
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prescience, a criminal defence solicitor, Michael Bosscher, noted the anomaly that 
the muzzle rule’s restrictions applied to lawyers when there was no equivalent 
restriction on politicians or police who might speak about the same proceedings.28 
And the earlier refusal to adopt the rule in Victoria undermined any claim that the 
muzzle rule was demanded merely in the interests of national uniformity.29 The 
criticism had the desired effect. The President of the Law Council of Australia, Tim 
Bugg, offered the disingenuous argument that the muzzle rule was ‘a restraint on 
speech, but not a restraint on free speech’,30 and then that lawyers did not enjoy free 
speech anyway because ‘they can only speak on behalf of the client’.31  However, 
after submissions from Queensland solicitors and consultation within its own 
management and committees,32 the Queensland Law Society rejected the rule. 
Instead, following the Victorian precedent,33 the Solicitors Rule that came into force 
on 1 July 2007 merely stated that ‘[a] solicitor must not publish, or take steps 
towards the publication of, any material concerning current proceedings for which 
the practitioner is engaged which may prejudice a fair trial of those proceedings or 
prejudice the administration of justice’.34 The rationale given by Law Society 
President Megan Mahon in July 2007 was, by Australian standards, an unusually 
broad defence of free expression.35 
 
… as a general principle, the presumption must be in favour of free expression and a 
burden on expression should only be permitted if it promoted some significant and 
compelling interest of good governance or the interests of justice. [The Queensland 
Law Society] Council also considered that any such burden must be the minimal 
restraint needed on expression in order to realise that interest and took the view that 
no such interest has been clearly articulated in support of draft Rule 19.  
 
 
III   ANALYSING THE MUZZLE 
 
A   Lawyers and the Right to Expression 
 
The practical difficulties that the muzzle rule would create when dealing with 
the media were also mentioned in Megan Mahon’s rationales for rejecting the Model 
Rules’ standard,36 but it is the moral justification for rejecting it that was stunning. 
Anyone familiar with American constitutional law will immediately recognise that 
Mahon’s language incorporated the ‘strict scrutiny’ analysis used by the United 
States Supreme Court for determining whether legal standards are compatible with 
                                                 
28  Chamberlin 1, see above n 10; Chamberlin 2, see above n 10; and also see Merritt and 
Thomas, see above n 26.  
29  Merritt and Thomas, see above n 26; ‘State Lawyers Act to Remove Media Muzzle’, see 
above n 10; C Merritt, ‘Law Council Plans Media Gag Review’, The Australian, 15 
June 2007, 21. 
30  ‘State Lawyers Act to Remove Media Muzzle’, see above n 10. 
31  Chamberlin 2, see above n 10. 
32  An amusing sideshow to the debate was the rush by some senior solicitors to claim 
responsibility for the Queensland Law Society’s rejection of the rule, even though they 
intervened after the Society had settled its position internally: see Merritt, see above n 
25; C Merritt, ‘Tangled Webb Departs’, The Australian, 6 July 2007, 34.  
33  Professional Conduct and Practice Rules 2005 (Vic) r 19.1 
34  Legal Profession (Solicitors) Rule 2007 (Qld) r 19.1. 
35  Queensland Law Society, President’s Message’ <https://www.qls.com.au/ 
content/lwp/wcm/ connect/QLS/For+the+Profession/Conduct+Rules/> at 30 October 
2009. 
36  Ibid. 
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some rights recognised in the US Bill of Rights.37 In practice, if strict scrutiny were 
applied to rights of expression the resulting standards would be much more speech-
protective than anything guaranteed by the Australian right to free communication in 
public and political matters. Indeed, given that the Queensland Solicitors Rule 
merely bans expression that goes directly to the conduct of a fair trial or the 
administration of justice, it is unlikely that any moderately broader restriction on 
expression could be justified by the Queensland Law Society’s strict scrutiny 
standards. Rule 19 of the Model Rules is seriously incompatible with a strong moral 
presumption that a lawyer can speak unless the administration of justice is actually 
prejudiced. And the presumption that the lawyer can speak rests on the same 
principles that John Clarke QC thought would improve government decision-making 
when terrorism allegations arose. There is a need for ‘robust and open discussion 
with respect to available evidence [and] the differences that existed’.38   
The Queensland bar’s Rule 60 is therefore just as problematic. The Bar 
Association never gave a rationale for the muzzle rule when adopting it;39 but then it 
was never forced into the position that the Law Society was. However, the difference 
leaves Rule 60 exposed to precisely the same criticisms. A barrister has no greater 
duties to the court, and no fewer duties to a client, than a solicitor has. Traditionally, 
barristers may have regarded themselves as being in a more ministerial, removed and 
even – perhaps – impartial position in relation to clients than solicitors were, but the 
modern expression of barristers’ and solicitors’ roles has emphatically denied that 
there could be any functional difference between them.40 Resting within the same 
web of ethical responsibilities as the Solicitors Rule, Rule 60 therefore has little to 
commend it. 
As a result, Keim suffered complaint and investigation for breaking a rule that, 
less than a month before he released the record of interview on 17 July 2007, had 
been carefully weighed in the professional and public arena, and had been found 
wanting. It is an even deeper irony that Michael Bosscher’s prophecy was fulfilled. 
Just a month earlier, Bosscher had foreshadowed the risk that the muzzle rule would 
ban lawyers from talking about cases that police and politicians would be free to 
speak about.41  And, in effect, that is what happened. It was the side that had first 
                                                 
37  Especially the Equal Protection Clause: see E Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law (2nd ed, 
2005) 818-21. Comparable legislative infringements of the First Amendment’s rights of 
expression would more typically be analysed in terms of ‘overbreadth’ or ‘vagueness’: 
GR Stone, LH Siedman, CR Sunstein, MV Tushnet and PS Karlan, The First 
Amendment (2nd ed, 2003) 117-24.   
38  Clarke, see above n 1, 230. 
39  An explanation for the rule was given ex post facto in the Bar Association’s report on 
the Keim investigation. The aim of limiting barristers’ expression in litigious matters to 
the courtroom is evident, but is explained by ‘an obvious unseemliness’ in contributions 
that might be made in an extra-curial forum. If extra-curial expression does not 
prejudice the administration of justice, it is hard to see that ‘unseemliness’ can amount 
to a moral justification for the rule: Bar Association of Queensland, see above n 6, 31.  
40  The clearest expression of this has been in cases involving the immunity of advocates – 
advocates regardless of whether they were barristers or solicitors. No difference 
between barristers and solicitors exists in role, liability or immunity. The parallel 
standards hold even between counsel and instructing solicitor: Rees v Sinclair [1974] 1 
NZLR 180, 186, 189-90; Feldman v A Practitioner (1978) 18 SASR 238, 239; Saif Ali v 
Sydney Mitchell & Co [1980] AC 198, 215, 224, 227; Giannarelli v Wraith (1988) 165 
CLR 543, 559, 576-77, 592, 593, 596; D’Orta-Ekenaike v Victoria Legal Aid (2005) 
223 CLR 1, 32, 120-1. See Bartley Submission, see above n 9, 5, where the claim that 
barristers have different duties is described as ‘anachronistic’.      
41  See above note 28. 
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given public expression to Dr Haneef’s record of interview in the media, albeit only 
in part, which then complained that the barrister did the same.  
The muzzle rule could certainly never survive the Law Society’s strict scrutiny 
standard, and Keim has a good argument that, if it were a law, in the context of the 
Haneef affair the muzzle rule might have violated Keim’s constitutional right to free 
expression in public and political matters. However, the muzzle rule in Rule 60 is not 
a law, and its peculiar status raises tricky questions as to how it could be affected by 
the barrister’s constitutional rights.  
 
B It’s Not Even Law! 
 
As mentioned, the first Queensland Barristers Rules were rules of a club, 
enforceable as terms of a compact or contract amongst the barristers who were 
members.42 Then, in 2004, when they were formalised as the Barristers Rule 2004, 
they became subordinate legislation. This is because, although presented to the 
Government by the Bar Association, they were made rules by the Governor in 
Council under the authority of statute.43 According to Queensland’s statute law, this 
gave the rule the status of subordinate legislation.44 It was law. 
The advent of the Legal Profession Act 2007 changed the procedure for 
formalising professional conduct rules. Instead of being made by the Governor in 
Council, rules are made by the Bar Association or the Queensland Law Society.45 
They only take effect once notified by the Minister for Justice.46 The reason for the 
change was nothing more than State Government tidiness. It was well known that the 
rules would largely replicate the Advocacy and Model Rules, and it was important for 
the sake of interstate uniformity that the original wording of these codes be used. 
However, the Advocacy and Model Rules use a different drafting style to that used by 
the Queensland Government, and the Government did not want to have 
responsibility for rules that would be expressed according to different protocols, 
formulae and styles. So, rule-making was relegated to the professional associations, 
with some Government control of the substance of the rules preserved by the 
notification procedure. The effect of the change in rule-making procedure is that the 
Barristers Rule 2007 – including its muzzle rule – is no longer subordinate 
legislation.47 
                                                 
42  See text above at n 19.  
43  Legal Profession Act 2004 (Qld) s 215(1)(b). A similar process was available for rules 
applicable to solicitors under s 215(1)(a), although it was never used. 
44  The Statutory Instruments Act 1992 (Qld) provides that ‘a rule’ is a statutory instrument 
if the rule is made under an Act: ss 7(2)-(3). ‘A rule’ is only a statutory rule if made by 
the Governor in Council or, if made by another person or body, must be approved by the 
Governor in Council or is subject to its disapproval: s 8. Under the Statutory 
Instruments Act, a statutory instrument amounts to subordinate legislation when it is 
‘declared to be subordinate legislation by an Act or a regulation made under the 
[Statutory Instruments Act]’: s 9(1)(c). In general, a rule that is a statutory rule is 
subordinate legislation: s 9(1)(a); see also s 9(2)(c). 
45  Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) ss 219-220. 
46  Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) s 225(1). 
47  The Legal Profession (Barristers) Rule 2007 (Qld) is made under an Act [ie, the Legal 
Profession Act 2007 (Qld)] and is therefore a statutory instrument: Statutory Instruments 
Act 1992 (Qld) ss 7(2)-(3). It is not, however, a ‘statutory rule’ (and therefore subordinate 
legislation) because it is not made by the Governor in Council, or approved by the 
Governor in Council, or subject to its disapproval: s 8. Under s 9 Statutory Instruments 
Act, a statutory instrument that is not a statutory rule is only subordinate legislation if it is 
‘declared to be subordinate legislation by an Act or a regulation made under the [Statutory 
Instruments Act]’. The Statutory Instruments Regulation 2002 (Qld) does not declare legal 
337  The University of Queensland Law Journal 2009 
 
 
Equally, the muzzle rule cannot be characterised as merely a consensual or 
contractual obligation along the lines of that assumed by members of the Bar 
Association before the Act of 2004. The Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) states 
clearly that the rules ‘are binding on’ barristers, and ‘failure to comply with legal 
profession rules is capable of constituting unsatisfactory professional conduct or 
professional misconduct’.48 As a result, barristers are liable to be scrutinised for their 
conformity with the rules by an independent regulator – the Legal Services 
Commissioner – and can suffer discipline for breaking a rule.49 In these situations, 
where the rule applies because someone practises a profession, it is unlikely that 
there is a voluntary assumption of consensual or contractual obligations as there is 
when someone joins a club or any other association.  
So the statute law in Queensland provides that the muzzle rule is not a law, but 
it also provides that the rule is ‘binding’ on barristers in some non-consensual sense. 
If the muzzle rule purported to be law because the Barristers Rule was subordinate 
legislation (as under the Act of 2004), then it would undoubtedly be invalid if its 
standards violated the constitutional right to free communication or a constitutionally 
protected role for a defence lawyer under Chapter III of the Constitution. On the 
other hand, if the standards of the rule were merely shouldered willingly (as they 
were before the Act of 2004), then, even though those standards would be 
contractually binding on members of the Bar Association, their compatibility with 
the Constitution would be irrelevant. There is the freedom to agree to obligations that 
restrict a freedom that the Constitution recognises. However, the present status of the 
muzzle rule is not easily characterised in accordance with these traditional categories 
of positive law. It makes no claim to be law, yet the law does claim that the rule is 
binding regardless of what the barrister agrees to. A non-legal rule that the law 
makes binding. 
 
 
IV CONCLUSION 
 
All of this raises constitutional and regulatory questions for which there are no 
easy answers. Let us assume that Keim’s substantive argument is correct. The 
muzzle rule, either on its face or in the context of circumstances like the Haneef 
affair, tries to invade a space that the Constitution secures against invasion – a space 
where expression is guaranteed, or a space where a lawyer’s role in legal 
proceedings is protected. Is the rule, despite its explicit non-legal quality, invalid?  
Or, is the Queensland Parliament’s legislative attempt to make the rule ‘binding’ 
(without the barrister’s agreement)50 the point at which invalidity would arise?51 Or 
                                                                                                                
profession rules to be subordinate legislation. The position is made even clearer in that 
Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) s 225(2), provides that the Minister’s notice that legal 
profession rules have been made is subordinate legislation. It does not state that the rules 
themselves are subordinate legislation. This has not prevented some barristers from 
assuming that the Legal Profession (Barristers) Rule 2007 (Qld) is ‘legislation’: see D 
Jackson and P Franco, ‘The Reintroduction of the Two Counsel Rule’, Hearsay, 
December 2007, [6]-[7], where it is argued that the two counsel rule could be reintroduced 
by amendment to the Barristers Rule, but not by ‘any non-statutory alternative’. It might 
well be, given the analysis in this article, that the Barristers Rule is itself a ‘non-statutory 
alternative’ – although it is a ‘statutory instrument’. 
48  Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) s 227. 
49  Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) s 452. 
50  See, eg, Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) s 227(1). 
51  For example, because where the effect of a provision is to violate the implied freedom 
of public and political communication, it is in violation of the Constitution: Nationwide 
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again, given that the rule only takes effect – and only becomes ‘binding’ – once the 
Minister for Justice notifies that it has been made,52 is the Minister’s notification 
void ab initio because it exceeds the limits of any constitutionally legitimate power?  
Would any investigation, or any discipline application lodged, by the Legal Services 
Commissioner (who is invested with powers exclusively by statute)53 be regarded as 
a nullity because, once more, it would necessarily exceed any possible constitutional 
power? 
Any one or more of these questions might receive a positive response. It might 
at first seem that, in raising the question of the effect that the Constitution might have 
on ‘the way that disciplinary rules are used’,54 Keim and I are simply pettifogging. 
However, the alternative is a more basic challenge to the Australian constitutional 
settlement. The alternative is that rules could be made and imposed under statutory 
authority, and yet, merely by denying them legislative status, they could escape 
judicial review for their compatibility with the Constitution’s standards. There is no 
indication that constitutional issues were considered in any of the referral of the 
investigation of Keim to the Bar Association, the Bar Association’s investigation and 
recommendation, or the Legal Service’s Commissioner’s (delegated) decision. It 
may also be that Keim’s substantive arguments of the muzzle rule’s possible 
violation of the freedom of public and political communication or of Chapter III are 
groundless. However, Biddle’s complaint about Keim was that that the release of the 
record of interview had broken Rule 60 and ‘amounted to … engaging in a political 
debate’.55 That phrase alone, not to mention the politically-charged circumstances of 
the Haneef affair, should have at least alerted the regulators to the possibility that the 
release of the record of interview could amount to constitutionally-protected 
expression. It is a dimension of lawyer regulation and discipline that should be 
considered. And, if it is the complexity of the constitutional issues that deters the 
Commissioner or the Bar Association from considering them, there is a simpler 
answer. There is no moral justification for a ban on lawyer expression beyond what 
is needed to assure a fair trial or the proper administration of justice. The muzzle rule 
should be abandoned.  
 
                                                                                                                
News Pty Ltd v Wills (1992) 177 CLR 1; Australian Capital Television Pty Ltd v 
Commonwealth (1992) 177 CLR 106; Theophanous v Herald & Weekly Times Ltd 
(1994) 182 CLR 104; Stephens v West Australian Newspapers Ltd (1994) 182 CLR 211. 
52  Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) s 225(1). 
53  Legal Profession Act 2007 (Qld) ch 4. 
54  Keim, see above n 11, 328.  
55  Bar Association of Queensland, see above n 6, 1. 
